EXHIBIT S

EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

V.

TAREK MEHANNA,

Defendant.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE GEORGE A. O'TOOLE, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DISPOSITION

John J. Moakley United States Courthouse
Courtroom No. 9
One Courthouse Way
Boston, Massachusetts 02210
Thursday, April 12, 2012
10:07 a.m.

Marcia G. Patrisso, RMR, CRR
Official Court Reporters
John J. Moakley U.S. Courthouse
One Courthouse Way, Room 3510
Boston, Massachusetts 02210
(617) 737-8728

Mechanical Steno - Computer-Aided Transcript

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     APPEARANCES:
 2
          OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
          By: Aloke Chakravarty and Jeffrey Auerhahn,
 3
              Assistant U.S. Attorneys
          John Joseph Moakley Federal Courthouse
          Suite 9200
 4
          Boston, Massachusetts 02210
 5
          - and -
          UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
 6
          By: Jeffrey D. Groharing, Trial Attorney
              National Security Division
 7
          950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
          Washington, D.C. 20530
          On Behalf of the Government
 8
          CARNEY & BASSIL
 9
          By: J.W. Carney, Jr., Esq.
10
              Janice Bassil, Esq.
              John E. Oh, Esq.
          20 Park Plaza
11
          Suite 1405
12
          Boston, Massachusetts 02216
          - and -
13
          LAW OFFICE OF SEJAL H. PATEL, LLC
          By: Sejal H. Patel, Esq.
14
          101 Tremont Street
          Suite 800
15
          Boston, Massachusetts 02108
          On Behalf of the Defendant
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              THE CLERK: All rise.
              (The Court enters the courtroom at 10:07 a.m.)
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              THE CLERK: For a sentencing in the case of
     Tarek Mehanna, Docket 09-10017. Would counsel identify
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     yourselves for the record.
              MR. CHAKRAVARTY: Good morning, your Honor. For the
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     government, Assistant U.S. Attorneys Aloke Chakravarty, Jeffrey
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     Auerhahn and Counterterrorism Section Attorney Jeffrey
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     Groharing.
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              THE COURT: Good morning.
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              COUNSEL IN UNISON: Good morning, your Honor.
              MR. CARNEY: Good morning, your Honor. J.W. Carney,
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     Jr., for Tarek Mehanna. With me is my co-counsel, Janice
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     Bassil, as well as Segal Patel and John Oh.
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              THE COURT: Good morning.
              MR. CARNEY: Good morning, your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Let me make a couple of preliminary
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     comments before we begin to address the substance of the
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     matters. First of all, the jury's verdict in this case is not
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     an issue and I accept it as, of course, any sentencing judge
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            It is also my judgment that the verdict was, in all
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     respects, supported by evidence produced in the course of the
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     trial. But a sentencing hearing is not an occasion for
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     questioning or revisiting the verdict.
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              The parties have submitted a good deal of material in
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support of their respective positions on sentencing issues. I have read and considered that material carefully, as I have the presentence report prepared by the probation office. And let me take this opportunity to thank our probation office and, in particular, Ms. Sinclair for the fine work she has done in this difficult case. So because I have studied the materials, I ask that counsel, in their oral arguments, to assume my close familiarity with the materials submitted and to try to minimize any redundancy.

Mr. Carney had previously indicated on behalf of the defendant his wish to have Dr. Ahmed Mehanna and Mrs. Mehanna make brief oral statements, and I had denied that request. This is consistent with my usual and customary practice to limit presentations at sentencing hearings to the defendant and to counsel only, and I adhere to that practice in this hearing. As opposed to oral statements, however, I routinely welcome, and have done so in this case, written submissions through counsel. And as I've noted, I have reviewed and considered those submissions in this case, including letters from each of the defendant's parents and from his brother. And I assure them that they have, in fact, been heard.

Consistent with applicable procedures, we will consider the issues this morning in this order: First, we will determine what sentencing range emerges as a recommendation from the proper application of the United States Sentencing

Guidelines; second, we will consider whether the Court should consider an authorized departure from that range consistent with guideline principles; and finally, we will consider the multiple factors set forth in the sentencing statute, 18 U.S. Code Section 3553(a), to determine an appropriate sentence.

In our federal system we take care to give sentencing decisions careful and detailed consideration. The process and sequence of decision-making, as I've just outlined it, for this morning are an example of that care. The parties' views are solicited early in the process in dialogue with the probation office, and at every stage decisions impacting the ultimate sentencing judgment are guided by specific address to any issue that may or should affect the outcome.

It is important to understand that sentencing judgments are not simply the product of one mind. The judge is not a monarch. In addition to input from the parties and the probation office, a sentencing judge also must consider the views of the lawmakers who adopted the relevant criminal statute and established its general range of sanction as well, of course, as the Sentencing Commission, which, with the approval of the Congress, has adopted and explained relevant Guidelines. Congress and the Sentencing Commission speak generally, however, while a sentencing judge thinks particularly with regard to the features of the present case. Consequently, it can also be important to consider what other

judges have decided in similar circumstances.

So the responsibilities for sentencing decisions are shared in this sense, and a sentence in a particular case is not simply the product of an individual, perhaps even idiosyncratic, judgment by the sentencing judge, but rather, the result of a broadly considered judgment that respects the roles and views of other courts and other branches of the government. And, of course, serious consideration of the Guidelines' recommendation is one way of consulting the views of other sentencing constituencies.

And as a final preliminary matter let me say what I hope is obvious. No judge I have ever known approaches the responsibility of imposing criminal punishment on the defendant with any sense of relish or eagerness. It is a necessary duty, solemnly performed after thorough reflection, consistent with the judge's oath and obligation.

Now, as I've said, a starting point for the consideration of all the factors that may bear on an appropriate sentence is the recommendation that emerges from an application of the Sentencing Guidelines. The probation office has prepared a thorough presentence report which proposes an application of the Guidelines in this case. I know that in some respects each side has some disagreement with that, and I think an efficient way to address it is to simply take the relevant parts of the presentence report and move through them

and make rulings as they are presented in sequence by the numbered paragraphs.

So I start with Paragraph 66 which recommends that the Guidelines Manual to be employed in this project is the current Guidelines Manual effective November 2011. I think the defendant has a different view. And if you want to address that, I'll hear from you now.

MR. CARNEY: Your Honor, when we received the presentence report we sent a list of very specific objections to probation. We've also submitted to your Honor, as you know, a separate document that addresses each of our objections with citations to case law, legislative intent, and other factors.

We are content to rest on our memorandum regarding those objections. I'm confident your Honor has looked at them carefully, reviewed the backup that we have presented. And we are certainly available to answer any specific questions your Honor might have. But if you do not, we want to be mindful of the fact that your Honor has indicated that you've read this material carefully and would be grateful if we were not simply repeating what we've already given you in writing.

THE COURT: Thank you. I have looked closely at this, and my conclusion is, in accordance with the prescriptions of the Guidelines themselves, that the current manual is the manual to be applied. There are, I think, two issues: One is which manual should be applied under the Guidelines themselves;

and the second is a question of ex-post-facto considerations. I'm not sure it's necessary to reach that constitutional question. The First Circuit has recently indicated in a case called *Rodriguez*, I believe, that it's preferable not to reach the constitutional question if it's not necessary.

I think that the decisions that we will make regarding the Guidelines and the ultimate effect of those decisions will not have an ex-post-facto effect, and so we need not reach the question of whether if it did in some way, that would invalidate the application of the current guideline. So I will use the current manual.

In Paragraph 67 the PSR identifies the specific Guidelines to be used for each of the several counts of the indictment. And without repeating it all, I believe that that is a correct assignment of the relevant individual guideline provisions.

The next point that I would confirm is in Paragraphs 68 and 69 which is, again, consistent with the Guidelines themselves, the seven counts should be grouped, as that is done under the Guidelines, and that when that is done, the computation for the count that yields the highest score is the one that is used for determining the proposed range.

So let's turn to Count 1. The guideline that applies is 2M5.3. It has a base offense level of 26. I think that's uncontroversial. The first adjustment that is made is under

2M5.3(b)(1)(E), and I believe that has not been objected to.

Let me move to Paragraph 73 which proposes an adjustment because the intended victims of the offense were government officers or officials or employees. The defense has objected to this. And I think just to, again, try to be efficient, I agree with the objection. I think that the adjustment under 3A1.2(a)(1)(A) requires specified individuals and not generalized reference to government employees. It's not an entirely clear matter. I think it's the better interpretation. And I think in matters with close questions such as this, the benefit of the doubt should go to the defendant.

Paragraph 74 suggests a victim-related -- well, it's called "victim-related" in the PSR. It's actually a terrorism adjustment of an upward level 12 increase pursuant to 3A1.4(a). The defense has also objected to this, but I think their objection is essentially a third-stage objection, if I can put it that way, not that the Guidelines applied on their own terms don't call for it, but that it shouldn't be none. In the papers the defendant has argued that some judges have declined to do it and so on. I take that not as an interpretation of the Guidelines but as a variance from them, and we'll address that at that point. I think it is an orthodox application of the Guidelines to give the 12 levels.

The defendant has also argued for a minor role

adjustment in the guideline. Having considered that, I think that it is not appropriate to give a minor role. As a matter of fact, as I will perhaps refer to later as we discuss some of the details of the case, my understanding of the evidence is that among the group of relevant participants here in the Massachusetts area, the defendant is more likely to have been seen as one of the leaders rather than a minor participant. I don't make an adjustment for leadership, but I just mention that to counter the suggestion that there might be a minor role assessment.

The government asks for a special skills adjustment of two levels under 3B1.3. And I do not think that is appropriate. I don't think language skill by itself, particularly for a person such as Mr. Mehanna whose skill in Arabic is likely close to a native language, even though he was, of course, born in America — he's probably been speaking English equally long. I noted at some point, I can't identify it exactly, that Arabic is frequently spoken in the home. And I think that that does not qualify as a special skill for purposes of the Guidelines.

In Paragraph 75 the presentence report proposes an obstruction of justice two-level increase for Count 1 and for some of the following counts. I believe that is a correct adjustment. And I rely on Application Note 8 to Guideline 3C1.1 which indicates that when there are multiple counts of

conviction, one of which is an obstruction count, it is appropriate in scoring to give the adjustment.

So to recap Count 1: base level of 26; adjustment under 2M5.3 of 2, which is 28; a further adjustment of 12, the terrorism adjustment, which is 40; and the obstruction which is 42.

Many of the proposed adjustments and actual adjustments that we've just addressed follow in subsequent counts. I don't think it's necessary to repeat those. But in Count 2 there was a question, anyway, about the proper base offense level. I think that's been resolved by my conclusion that the current Guidelines Manual applies, and so it is a 33. Again, making no role adjustment, no special-skill adjustment, no separate victim-related adjustment for officers of the government, making the terrorism adjustment and the obstruction adjustment, Count 2 becomes a level 47. And that is true of Counts 3 and 4 as well for the same reasons.

Counts 5 through 7 are governed by the obstruction guideline 2J1.2. The base offense level of 14, an adjustment sufficient to bring the adjusted level to 32, which is an 18-point adjustment. And so the score is 32 for Counts 5 through 7.

Now, 3A1.4(b) also provides that the criminal history should be deemed to be a Category VI. So the highest score on this application of the Guidelines would be a level 47 at a

Category VI, which is literally off the charts, and the recommended sentence under those conditions from the Guidelines is a life sentence. I don't think there's any point in -- even before we get to the specifics of an appropriate sentence -- considering that a life sentence is an appropriate sentence. I do not intend to impose a life sentence in this case. Even the government does not recommend that. This will be a term of years, and it will be affected by the sentencing factors of Section 3553(a).

So we've completed the first step. I don't think there are any suggestions of an authorized departure within the Guidelines regime. There are, of course, arguments for a non-guideline sentence under the doctrine of Booker and its following cases. So with that in mind, I'll entertain specifically your recommendation for a given sentence in light of all the statutory factors.

MS. BASSIL: Your Honor, before we proceed, this morning while I was in the hallway a juror approached me, and she is here in the courtroom today, and she has stated that she wants to speak at sentencing and she would like to be heard by the Court. She had stated that when -- I guess when you talked to the jurors, you had said if they had any issues they could come back. She's back. She would -- and she is here today and she would like to be heard, and I think she should be heard, your Honor.

1 THE COURT: I see no reason to do that. 2 MS. BASSIL: Well, I would like to make an offer of 3 proof, your Honor, of what she would say. THE COURT: You can submit one in writing. 4 MS. BASSIL: Your Honor --5 6 THE COURT: No, I don't want to get into that. 7 would be highly unorthodox, contrary to the law. And I am confident that if I said to the jurors informally that they 8 9 were welcome back, it was if they had an interest in the 10 proceedings, not as a participant in the proceedings. So it would be highly irregular. And I won't even at this point 11 entertain an offer on it. If you want to complete the record 12 by a written offer subsequent to sentencing, I'll permit that. 13 14 Mr. Chakravarty? MR. CHAKRAVARTY: Your Honor, you sat through this 15 trial. True to form, I'm not going to repeat all of the 16 It's impossible to summarize the insight into the 17 18 defendant that your Honor had. 19 As we assess especially the 3553(a) factors, we should 20 not dismiss entirely the value assessment, the considered 21 opinion of the Sentencing Commission in setting one data point 22 for the Court, one that the government is clearly not arguing 23 is the only appropriate sentence in this case. But as I'm sure 24 your Honor has struggled with, to find the relevant factors

with which to quantify a term of years is no small feat, to do

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it accurately, considering any mitigating factors as well as the gravity of the offense here. And so that's where I want to start, at the gravity of the offense here.

The crimes that the defendant has been convicted of are amongst the most serious in our system of justice. In the federal criminal law, they are uniquely suited to punishment and deterrence through criminal procedure. It's the only way to prevent people from becoming homegrown violent extremists who would embark on campaigns to kill soldiers of the very country in which they live. That was the harm here. That is the nature of the offense, and it's one that statutorily calls for up to a life sentence. The Guidelines say based on those factors that a life sentence is appropriate. And so with that in mind, what about this defendant can you look at to see on that spectrum of thought to action, to actually committing a successful offense of actually killing soldiers, where does the defendant fit?

In this case we focused a lot on Yemen; we focused a lot on his activities online, recruiting others, providing support for al Qa'ida; we focused a lot on his obstructive activities. And those are the natures of the harms that he caused. But it didn't start with Yemen, your Honor; it started back in 2001. Over a decade ago this defendant began to radicalize. This was not a flight of fancy. This was not a misunderstanding. If there was any misguiding involved, as

your Honor alluded to, it was this defendant that was misguiding others. It was this defendant who had the unique combination of knowledge, charisma, of persuasive ability in language to be able to bring others to his way of thinking, in this case a way of thinking which advocated for and conspired, ultimately, to visit violence upon Americans.

Regardless of where one sits on the spectrum of whether American foreign policy is legitimate or the war in Iraq is appropriate, when you conspire to take up arms against your country, it deserves severe penalties, not just to incapacitate an individual, but to deter that individual and all others who might embark on the same course of action or similar course of action in the future. And that's the lens through which I ask you to view what is the impact of the defendant's activity. What is the actual harm that he brought to visit?

And when he returned from Yemen, he didn't abandon -he didn't change his heart. He didn't abandon his ideas of
even going over in an armed campaign. He discussed it again
with Abousamra. He discussed the potential with

Daniel Maldonado when, of all the people in the world to call,
Maldonado called the defendant from Somalia. He discussed it
again with his prospective wife, reaffirming that indeed he had
tried to join that company but he was rejected because he
didn't have sufficient people to vouch for him.

Well, now this defendant is famous, your Honor. When he gets out of prison, whenever that is, this trial will be his credentials. He does have that credibility now, and I submit to you that's what he gained by embarking on his quest in Yemen. When he came back locally, I'd venture to guess that most people in the community had no clue as to what this defendant and his coconspirators had attempted to do. They had no clue as to how extreme his ideology had progressed, such that taking up arms was the appropriate answer.

It's with that mentality that he then began cultivating others, some of whom testified in this courtroom; that he helped radicalize those individuals, empowered in part by his demonstrated commitment to the cause of al Qa'ida, Salafi jihadists, others who would take up arms against what he felt was his obligatory duty to stand up against the country in which he lived: them. To him the world was about "us," Muslims who were being persecuted, and "them," the persecutor, the United States, this tribunal who is now going to be passing judgment on him.

As we know, your Honor, he didn't just stay focused on exclusively armed campaigns against American soldiers. He then thought, as an opportunist: What else can I do to support that mission? If I am unsuccessful in going over myself, how can I motivate others? How could I motivate the Abu Bakrs and the Spauldings and the Massouds and the Maldonados to go and be

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successful at what I tried and failed to do? And he found his niche.

Together with the Tibyan Publications folks, he developed this charismatic persona empowered largely because of his knowledge, because he had the credibility, because people knew about his prior failed campaign to Yemen in which he had collaborated with some of the Tibyan Publications folks. And it was with that credibility, with that nuanced understanding of the Salafi Jihadi message, al Qa'ida's messaging, with which he embarked on several translation products: "39 Ways," "Umar Hadid." You heard all about those. We've submitted papers describing how influential they are. We described Mr. Qureshi, who specifically asked for that just before he embarked on an armed campaign. But there were others, your Honor. There were such other messengers tested. There was "Tawhid of Action." There was "The Importance of the Word." There were other products that he published through Tibyan Publications for that same purpose.

I submit to you the impact of the harms created through that work lasts not just in those individuals whom he personally was able to touch by persuading that Osama bin Laden's message was the right one, but those products are still on the internet. Those products are still viral. People are still getting arrested for even possessing in some countries those products. Well, that's not a crime here. When he

translated and distributed those for that specific purpose so that others would be recruited into the cause that he was willing to sacrifice his life for, then in many ways he succeeded in his objective.

And the third nature of the harm, your Honor, is the obstructive conduct all throughout. After he returned from Yemen, it was not long after that he knew that the FBI had learned of what he had done, at least in some measure. And both through his false statements, of which he's been convicted, but also through every other opportunity where he has had to say something about his activity, about Abousamra's activity, about Maldonado's activity or any of the other people who engaged in terrorist activities, he has tried to obstruct, to impede, to thwart the FBI in learning anything that will protect the United States from terrorism. Because that's where his heart lies.

He told you as much in his submission to the Court when of all the things that he had to say to the Court for leniency in this case, at least in writing, he seized that opportunity to again point to the FBI for inconveniencing him, for again blaming the FBI for this plight that brings us here today. It's the absence of any recognition of responsibility for one of his actions.

And when he says it's a collision of two worlds colliding, I couldn't agree more. And when he says his heart

can't change or won't change or won't leave, I submit to you the criminal laws are not designed to change what somebody believes, and they won't in this case. And it's that person who we now have to decide what is the appropriate sentence based on proportionality, based on what he has done, what the impact of his crimes are, and based on what his opportunity is to change and to realize a potential that he threw away slowly over the last ten years.

He's rare in that he's one of very few individuals who's been charged with criminal offenses, that has tried to engage in terrorism acts himself, and recruited others persistently over a period of time, adapting his methodology, encrypting his communications. When his coconspirators were being arrested around the world, he didn't go underground. He specifically said that he should not stop the enterprise; they just have to be more careful. And he continued.

exhausted through means outside of this courtroom. And that's why the government feels that a very substantial jail sentence is necessary, in the first instance to incapacitate him, to prevent him from continuing to do these crimes, but also to specifically deter him from engaging in any terrorism-related crime when he gets out.

Another significant fact to consider in assessing this decade of activity, understanding that there were certain

portions of that decade in which he was much more active and much more influential than in others, is -- unlike in many other cases there was no government engineering here, your Honor. This was the defendant radicalizing with his colleagues here. It was the defendant persuading others what Sayyid Qutb and Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden, amongst others, said and meant and believed. It was not a cooperator who was planting a seed into the defendant's mind to give him some low-hanging fruit to snatch onto, not to suggest that that's an improper technique in any way. But the defendant cannot hide behind some misguided principle of government sentencing entrapment or something else; this was entirely the defendant's creation. And it was only after the fact that the government was able to learn about what the defendant had done.

And it was in that vein that when he continued to obstruct government investigation, when he knew they were watching, he was telling others to be careful about what they said to him online. He told people not to say certain things openly. When he knew he was under investigation, that's when he chose to lie to the FBI about Daniel Maldonado. If we had known about the whereabouts -- if we had the details about where Daniel Maldonado and Omar Hamammi were before they embarked in actual military conflict, their lives would be very different, and so would the people who they may have been engaged in conflict with.

But the most telling example of that, your Honor, is that if he had told us about what Abousamra and he had done two years prior, then Abousamra may never have been able to leave the country in the first place and evade the justice that is now being visited upon the defendant.

And so in factoring our decision as to what an appropriate sentence is so that we can give you another data point around which you can establish what the appropriate sentence is, if a variance is appropriate, understand we have to leave room for Ahmad Abousamra who was equally as culpable, if not more; had personally embarked on the trips to Pakistan, the trip to Iraq that they had all discussed; and had talked to the defendant again about going back to Pakistan two years after the defendant had come back from Yemen. That was still what the defendant said he was thinking, the exact same thing.

There was still a meeting of the minds. They had not abandoned any of their ambitions. And that is why I submit, your Honor, his obstructive conduct -- the impact of that obstructive conduct will last with us just as long as the impact of his translation activities, just as long as the impact of radicalization of individuals in our local community and others he knew through the internet. Those are lasting impacts. That's the nature of the harm that will impact this community for years to come.

Unlike most other criminal terrorism defendants, his

influence -- this defendant's influence -- not just because of the media attention or because the courtroom is packed, but because he personally touched so many people in their path to radicalization -- some of them have fortunately withdrawn from that path, but we don't know who else this defendant radicalized, that he has wound up and sent along their way. And there's evidence that he has done that kind of radicalization.

There's Taimur. There's -- he talks about a guy named Abu Dawood. He talks about the witnesses who testified here. Those people are out there, amongst others, and that is the harm which these stringent, strict criminal laws are designed to deter people from embarking on. And so it's this principle of general deterrence that this defendant encapsulates that other criminal defendants don't.

People are watching this case not just because of the so-called constitutional issues or because there's some novel legal ground here. They're watching this case because what the defendant represents is the harm of homegrown violent extremism. It's the metastasization of this perverted interpretation of a great faith to motivate other people to take up arms against a country who is providing them protection, who's giving them an opportunity of freedom of religion and freedom of speech.

So in weighing how we can arrive at the government's

recommendation of a 25-year sentence with a term of supervised release to follow as long as the defendant stays in the country -- and I suggest that would mean essentially a life sentence with special conditions -- we're giving you a data point that we did not have ourselves. We have the Guidelines which consider the fact that terrorism cases are different. They're different because of the gravity of the harm. They're different because the nature of the individual is such that they're unlikely to change. They are more likely to repeat a terrorism-related crime. They're different because the nature of the offenses are so often complex.

And given that data point of a life sentence, we've given you another which we think is a reasonable sentence in this case, but not just to address the public safety functions. We pride ourselves, your Honor, on maintaining credibility with the Court when we weigh mitigating factors. And I submit to you, your Honor, the government knows this defendant as well as anyone, not just because we're familiar with the evidence, we've presented it to your Honor, but because of the nature of the evidence, the nature of the witnesses with whom we've had access to.

We can understand many of the mitigating factors which the defendant's family, for example, and community have presented before the Court. And we're not unmindful of those.

But we've also seen the other side. We've seen the side that

can ignore those factors and, in fact, do insult to that community relationship and that family relationship because it was this defendant that brought that impact to his family. It was this defendant whose choices over time in the face of his parents trying to stop him, trying to discourage him repeatedly from embarking on this wrong path, to be dismissive, to be influential on others, and ultimately, now as we've seen after he's been in custody on this case, to be spreading misinformation so that he can reinvent himself as some type of a martyr to this community and to his family by telling a story -- a fictitious story -- about the person who they wished he was, not the person who actually you've had the opportunity to observe over the last couple of months.

And I thought, what is the most pithy way to encapsulate that person, the person about whom the government is concerned needs to be protected from society? We spared the jury the images of the beheadings that the defendant had on his computer and that he had distributed to others. We spared your Honor that. But I submit to your Honor, if one were to watch some of the videos that the defendant had distributed, talked about gleefully, there's a visceral reaction unlike anything else that you can see with your eyes when somebody, a civilian, has been held captive, he's restrained, his head is slowly sawed off while he's screaming, and then it goes silent, and then his head is held up to a camera.

There's a gut-wrenching visceral reaction to that that cannot be ignored. It captures what this defendant was at that time when he talked about that glowingly, when he thought that that was not only a justified action but that was the justice that was visited upon the country who had invaded a Muslim land. It was the defendant who talked about Texas BBQ being the only way to go when talking about the mutilation of burned American corpses overseas.

And to put context in that, your Honor, the question by the person he was talking to in that conversation was what is happening to the American soldier perpetrators of a rape in Iraq in the court system. And he says, "I don't care what's happening in the court system. Texas BBQ is the way to go."

It's the person who condemned Muslim-American advocates and others who proclaimed that moderation, and not violence, is the solution to enfranchisement and emboldening civil rights. Repeatedly. We quoted some of those materials; we don't need to repeat them here. It's the person who goes to Ground Zero to celebrate the acts of September 11th. And not more than two months ago, your Honor, after his conviction, in one of the exhibits that we've submitted as part of our sentencing submissions, this defendant, in going through a number of quotes that he is reading while he's in jail awaiting sentencing — he first proclaims that he is 100 percent free of American oppression, but then he quotes Osama bin Laden's

interview with Tayseer Alouni of CNN a month after the September 11th actions as something that he is reading right now in jail. This is the person who you have to sentence and determine what is going to deter this person from engaging in support activities in the future.

Your Honor, it's ironic that after all this time the defendant has not acknowledged any activity -- any criminal activities in going to Yemen, in any of his preparatory actions in that respect. He still cloaks his activities with Tibyan Publications online in the First Amendment, and it's ironic that it was his conversations with his coconspirators in which they talk about the filthy Constitution and the cursed Bill of Rights which actually protects his conduct. And now he's trying to use that -- and I'm sure he will upon review -- to try to shield himself from criminal liability for actions that he embarked on for almost a decade persistently, consistently, in order to support organizations and individuals who were at war with the United States.

And so another point that we perhaps agree on is this case is unique and there are no comparison cases. And I submit to your Honor looking at comparisons of other cases is not useful in order to divine what term of years is the appropriate sentence here, and that's because there's no way through a few sound bytes or some effective advocacy that we're going to be able to convey to you the myriad of 3553(a) factors and the

complex series of decisions and facts that may have gone into any decision with another specific fact pattern.

There are, of course, overlaps. And it's not that those other cases are without any value, but I submit to you other cases are of value to your Honor in assessing how a court may have arrived at an opinion, the process. But the facts, especially of this case, where somebody is engaged in three types of harm over such a long period of time with such influence is exceptional.

And I submit to you the cases that are most instructive, especially with regards to process, are the appellate cases the government has cited. And it's not just because they were remanded sentences because there were sentences that were -- deemed to be too low, but I submit to you in all of those cases the government -- the court sentence was below the government's recommendation.

But in those cases they pointed to, specifically, the imperfection of looking at other district court cases to try to divine what the proper sentence might be in a case. And, of course, we could select some from the defendant's own submissions, individual cases from around the country that would, if that were the appropriate model, be influential to your Honor, you know, cases like *Kassir*; cases like *Tamimi*, one of the defendant's heroes; cases like *Abuali*; and cases like the Eastern District of New York case that was decided I think

just about last month, Betim Kaziu, who the government would argue was much less culpable than this defendant but in that case received a 27-year sentence. I could elaborate on those, but as I pointed out, other cases are not how your Honor should decide what this defendant should get.

And so we come back to this idea of deterrence, what the impact of the defendant's actions are and, ultimately, his risk of recidivism which I think, your Honor, the defense sorely misstates. The 3A1.4 enhancement expressly acknowledges that terrorism cases are different especially because of the likelihood of recidivism. The Meskini case which the Jayyousi court cited approvingly points out that terrorism defendants are at increased risk of repeating and less likely to be rehabilitated. And the nature of the harm in a terrorism case is potentially catastrophic impacting not just, you know -- not just society at large, but specific individuals in the worst way.

And it's this defendant where you don't have to rely upon just the reasoned assessment of the Sentencing Commission and these appellate courts. Over ten years you've seen that nothing would deter this defendant. Sure, he got smarter, sure, he adapted his techniques, but is there anything to suggest that he was ever contrite? Is there anything to suggest that he has looked back upon that life that he had led for most of his adult life? How do you deter somebody who told

his fiancée that he was willing to go to jail and even to die for his beliefs? And so he's reinventing himself now as this martyr that he was unable to become in the throes of his conspiracy.

Your Honor, I want to conclude with talking about the lingering impact on the community, on others who he radicalized, on people around the world who are consuming his work, people who -- not just English-speaking who he was able to make accessible the teachings of al Qa'ida and its supporters, but because the defendant translated materials into English, as the Lingua Franca, as Evan Kohlmann and others have said, it was that translation that was able to then be translated into other languages to be distributed all around the world to actually make a difference in influencing people to join a cause dedicated to violence.

That's what this case has always been about. It's about how he was influenced that way, it was how he influenced his coconspirators and those in the circle of the Massachusetts community, and it's how he continued to do so online in the face of people -- associates of his who had done -- who had participated in portions of his conspiracy, getting arrested. He continued to engage in his actions.

The damage that he has done will linger with us. This case isn't going away. It's going to be looked at in the future by people who are contemplating acts of violence. It's

going to be looked at by future courts. It's going to be looked at by the FBI and those in law enforcement who are trying to figure out: How do we keep this country safe from terrorist attacks? How do we prevent people from going overseas to engage in terrorist attacks? How do we prevent radicalization?

And there is learning here. And there's learning created by the defendant over a long period of time. And most importantly, his reticence to assist the government, and there's no -- I say that for a moment. He's perpetuated lies on the internet about the fact that this is somehow a malicious prosecution. And I recognize your Honor's not going to be considering that as part of a sentencing issue, but first, it's inaccurate; and second, there's nothing wrong with soliciting cooperation from someone in the community, even if it's testifying against a fellow Muslim, if it's going to keep people safe. And I think most of the people behind me agree with that. This defendant does not.

He has exhibited throughout the course of the trial evidence, as well as after trial, that if he can protect people who are trying to kill Americans because of their faith, then he will do so. That is one of these legacies that -- of the impact of his actions and his aggravating actions, I would argue, after the fact. The impact on the community, your Honor, I submit to you, is a reason why a lengthy prison

sentence is appropriate.

So finally, the Guidelines are, no doubt, a significant upward pressure, as they should be. The government has selected a data point for your Honor which is mindful of both the Guidelines as well as the 3553(a) factors, including the most important notion, I think, in the 3553(a) factors which is that this Court is trying to find a proportional sentence that is no greater than necessary. And that is a driving principle with which we arrived at this sentencing recommendation.

What the defendant will do after he gets out of jail one can only guess. We hope for the best. He will still be -- have productive years ahead of him when he gets out if he demonstrates any willingness to conform his behavior, to acknowledge what he has done. You can't change unless you acknowledge what you've done that was wrong. And this defendant simply has not done that. All of the evidence shows just the opposite. And so that's concerning, and that's one of the reasons why a supervised release period -- a lengthy supervised release period is necessary.

But supervised release, as your Honor knows, is no substitute for incapacitation. Whatever terrorism support crimes that he might do, whether it's here or overseas, he could do it on supervised release. It's simply a warning system or some way of holding accountable somebody who's done

that.

So it's this downward pressure of trying to find a sentence that is no greater than necessary that is at the other pole. And it's in that sense that the government thinks that the 25-year sentence is appropriate from the people who, I believe, know the defendant as well as anyone, who have considered all of the materials that the government -- that the defense has submitted, and knows some of the individuals who have spoken in support of the defendant.

I want to point to one point on that, and this will be in closing. And this is a submission by the defense. One of his supporters writes, "I'd like you to take a moment to imagine the current state of Muslims in Massachusetts alone. Our Islamic centers are cultural melting pots and adults often mix culture and politics with religion. In this state we have about 40 mosques, Islamic centers and prayer halls. At the same time we've had only two resident scholars (Imams) in the entire state for the last few years. Furthermore, these Imams are immigrants who live sheltered lives and lack an understanding of our society. What happens to our youth who become inclined towards faith? Where do they go to learn Islam? Who can teach them?

"Most end up on the internet where they learn from scholars in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Yemen. Some scholars are mainstream; others walk a dangerous path. It's very hard for

some to distinguish between the two because some scholars present a moderate view of Islam and slowly pull people into a more radical version."

This supporter, your Honor, is describing the defendant. The evidence of that came in to demonstrate that over a ten-year period, that's what he did. So to suggest there's nothing to say he's not doing that now? A substantial sentence is necessary to incapacitate him, to deter him, to deter others from following in his footprints. And that is what the support is for the government's sentencing recommendation.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Carney?

MR. CARNEY: Thank you, your Honor.

Before I begin identifying five factors that I think the Court should give the highest consideration to, I'd like to comment on the government's oral argument and its sentencing memorandum. It's clear from what Mr. Chakravarty has written and what he said that the prosecutor wants the defendant not just to be punished for the conduct that he did underlying the criminal charges, but suggests explicitly that he should be punished because of statements that he made which are protected by the First Amendment, be punished for the fact that he went to trial, and be punished for the fact that he decided not to become an informant against the Muslim community.

The overwhelming amount of evidence in this trial consisted of speech. It consisted of Tarek translating documents that are freely available and legal to read on the internet and you're able to read if you speak Arabic. The government wants to prohibit someone from translating the Arabic to English and, therefore, prohibit American citizens from being able to read what other people say whose points of view are different than ours. That is an attack on the First Amendment.

Showing other people videos that are available on YouTube and undeniably legal to look at should not be part of punishment for a crime. Expressing support for Muslims that are resisting an invading army is something that President Reagan himself prays, because that army was the Soviet Union. It should not then become a prosecution just because it is a different army that invaded a Muslim country.

This case has gone farther than any other case in the Department of Justice in terms of basing a prosecution on speech. The U.S. Supreme Court had some prescient words in Holder versus Humanitarian Law Project. They upheld the material support statute when the plaintiffs in that case explicitly acknowledged that they wanted to provide training and services to a terrorist group. And the court said, "That prohibition is clear." The court went on to say, "All this is not to say that any future applications of the material support

statute to speech or advocacy will survive First Amendment scrutiny; in particular, we in no way suggest that a regulation of independent speech would pass constitutional muster even if the government were to show that such speech benefits foreign terrorist organizations."

This trial presented that important constitutional issue at almost every turn, and yet the prosecutor wants to punish the defendant because of his exercise of that free speech. His father, still sitting in the courtroom as he had every day during the trial, told me that he sometimes would have talks with his son about whether Tarek should be so bold in his public statements. The father's background was of Egypt where such speech was draconianly punished. Tarek's response is interesting. He would say, "It's okay, Dad. We're in America."

And it is an affront to our Constitution that the prosecutor suggests, quite explicitly in its memo, that Tarek should be punished for going to trial because his defense was frivolous. He believed that his statements and conduct regarding speech were protected by the Constitution. It's not an issue that will be settled today, but it's an affront to say he should be punished because he did so.

The prosecution, in its memo and again today, states that Tarek should be punished because he refused to become an informant against the Muslim community. He refused to

cooperate. Is this the ultimate message that the United States is trying to send from this case? It's instructive to look at how they've treated Kareem Abu Zahra, a coconspirator and a witness for the United States, rather. He was four years older than Tarek. It was his idea for a shopping mall attack, one that the government's evidence showed Tarek opposed and convinced Daniel Maldonado that it would be wrong because of the Islamic tenet of Aman. It was Abu Zahra who went to New Hampshire to try to get automatic weapons. It was Abu Zahra who had familiarity with Hanscom Air Force Base and proposed an attack there, once again opposed by Tarek. It was Abu Zahra who talked about harm against John Ashcroft or Condoleezza Rice when Tarek was not even present.

Abu Zahra enthusiastically embraced going to Iraq. He paid Jason Pippin \$5,000 to give Abu Zahra a contact in Yemen. He paid for Tarek's ticket. And if Abu Zahra had not paid for Tarek's ticket, Tarek never could have gone on this adventure, as he viewed it. And upon his return, Abu Zahra was fully interviewed by the FBI and told a completely fanciful story to them; in other words, making repeated false statements.

He did so much worse than Tarek Mehanna. But because he cooperated, he wasn't even charged with a misdemeanor. I say this because it suggests that the message of this prosecution, in the government's eyes, is that you will be punished if you don't become an informant against the Muslim

community. And because he didn't become an informant, the government says he's now one of the most dangerous people in America? The government's audacity in how it treated Kareem Abu Zahra compared to Tarek Mehanna is breathtaking in its hypocrisy.

Let me turn to the factors that I think are most important for your Honor to consider. First is Tarek's age at the time of the relevant offense. Tarek was a teenager when the conspiracy began. He was influenced by the fact that he was developing a greater interest and admiration for his religion and his heritage. He was 21 years old when he went to Yemen.

In Roper versus Simmons the U.S. Supreme Court held that life imprisonment is unconstitutional for juveniles in non-homicide cases. The court's decision is helpful in making your sentencing decision, your Honor. I'll quote from the opinion. "Recent studies of the brain conclude that its development may not be complete until the age of 25." The justices further wrote, "As any parent knows, and as scientific and sociological studies confirm, a lack of maturity and an undeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions." They are talking about someone 25; Tarek was 21.

In addition, Tarek led a sheltered life by American standards. He was living at home with his parents throughout the eight years he attended college, until he received his Ph.D. He never once drank alcohol; he never did drugs; never went out on a date because it was forbidden until he found the woman he was going to marry. His interests were classical Arabic and Islamic jurisprudence. He would spend hours upon hours reading the Qur'an and reading the Hadiths. He never traveled unless it was with his parents and his younger brother.

Like most young people, life at that age is black and white; a person simply doesn't have the life experience that allows him to understand that the world is much more complex than that. Tarek was never motivated by hatred or greed. He was most affected by the suffering that he saw particularly by women and children, initially by the embargo in Iraq that included medicine and food, and then the casualties among women and children when the war began.

Your Honor, I recall when I was in college, being taught by the Jesuits, that it was during the time of the troubles in Northern Ireland and all the suffering that was being experienced by Irish Catholics there. I hated the occupying British army. And I thought about leaving school and going to Ireland and joining the IRA. When you're young, things seem so black and white, especially when it's your own

people who are affected. I know that feeling when you're a 21-year-old.

The evidence at trial showed unmistakably that Tarek did mature after he returned from Yemen. You know that from the five lead government witnesses who were going through the same progression as Tarek. Every single one of the witnesses acknowledged that they and Tarek grew more mature and their views moderated. Your Honor saw that from Tarek's postings on web forums which showed a more moderate presentation in substance and in tone, and, in fact, that he was objecting to virtually all of the tenets of al Qa'ida. The government didn't want to present these postings because it would undermine their view of Tarek. But it's incontrovertible that his moderation in his views that was a reflection of his maturity led him to be exiled and expelled from the Tibyan Publications web forum.

Is there any doubt, your Honor, that if Tarek Mehanna had gotten on that plane in 2008 that today he would be an esteemed practitioner in the foremost hospital in the Middle East, that he would be a devote Muslim, married and raising his family?

In addition to his age at the outset of this conspiracy, it's also important to consider what the conduct is underlying the offenses. I have appeared before your Honor since 1982. I appeared before you in the Boston Municipal

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Court when I was a full-time public defender. I appeared before you in the superior court when I was a prosecutor. I've appeared before you many times, sometimes on trials, many more times on pleas, in this court. I've appeared before you when guideline numbers have been very high and the defendant met the criteria of a career offender, but in my experience, what your Honor would do is look at the person's background and look at the conduct involved. If he's someone who engaged in a lifetime of crime and continued to be involved in activity that hurt people, engaged in violence, in selling drugs, whatever it might be, your Honor had no hesitation to treat him as a career offender. But if it was someone who the evidence showed was involved in activities that were different, that were perhaps to support a drug habit, I've always found your Honor would get to the heart of the case and be more concerned about the defendant's eligibility for the 500-hour drug rehabilitation program in prison rather than burying him under the courthouse as a career offender. And I urge your Honor to engage in the same analysis here.

Rather than focus on the inflammatory language used by the government in its memo and oral presentation, I'd ask the Court to focus on what did the defendant do, and equally important, what did he not do? He did not go to Pakistan with Abousamra when he had the chance in 2001. He went to Yemen eight years ago, in 2004, spent one week, and then came back to

the United States and resumed his studies, and never again went to a foreign country in the same manner.

He did not go with Abousamra to Iraq even though there was absolutely nothing to prevent him from doing it except that that's not what Tarek was going to do. He never sought out training camps in the times he went to Egypt when it was well known they were present in that country. Even when a close friend, Daniel Maldonado, pleaded with him to come to Somalia, Tarek rebuffed it.

And, your Honor, it gives some insight into Tarek's mental state when you look at the details of that phone call.

Maldonado is extolling living in an Arabic country and engaging in jihad. What questions does Tarek have? "Are there any bookstores there?" he asked Maldonado. Maldonado says, "Yeah, sure, there are bookstores, I guess." "Are there women there that I could marry?" It was more important for this young man that he have an ability to continue pursuing his studies and that he could get married and begin having a family.

Tarek lived the principle of Aman, and

Daniel Maldonado told this Court how it was Tarek who convinced him of that. You know Tarek has no prior criminal record whatsoever. In the years that he's been under the most intense confinement at a prison, he's not picked up a single disciplinary report. Not one.

The prosecution describes Tarek as being such a

dangerous man, that he's currently such a clear and present danger to the United States, and that's why this extraordinary sentence should be imposed. Well, is that how they viewed him from 2001 until the superseding indictment was returned in 2009 and he was arrested for material support? They knew he went to Yemen, and the FBI questioned him about his going to Yemen. They secretly searched his home during this period from 2001 until 2009. They read his email; they collected his text messages; they saved all of his postings on web forums; they wiretapped his phone; they enlisted his friends to record the conversations. They knew everything about this man. And in 2008, when he was arrested for making a false statement, they withheld from this Court all of that evidence, and as a result, Tarek Mehanna was released on bail.

What did he do? He taught math and science in a school after he was let out on bail. It was five years after Tarek had returned from Yemen that the government got around to charging him with that offense. This is simply not the way our government treats an individual who is a clear and present danger to the United States. It's not. And they know it. That's why they were content to let him be released on bail in 2008, and stay there for another nine months, because they knew better than anyone that he was not that clear and present danger.

The third factor is comparable cases. We presented

many details and reports and charts and graphs, and I'm not going to repeat it because I know your Honor has read it. The average sentence imposed in a terrorist, so-called, case is 14 years. And that does not include cases where the defendant cooperated and received a 5K1 departure. It's instructive that this group of cases includes people who tried to blow up an airplane or set off a van in Times Square with explosives or pressed the detonator, thinking it was real when it had been given to him by the FBI. It included cases where defendants obtained explosives, did firearms training and sophisticated surveillance of targets. At the low end of the spectrum it includes people who talked about doing things but never became operational and never came close to hurting anyone, and those are people who received sentences in the single digits.

The government says the Court should not look at comparable cases. Well, the Congress, through the Sentencing Guidelines, and the Supreme Court have said repeatedly that the Court must look at comparable cases. The government's recommendation for the conduct involved in this case is unprecedented in its severity and is so far above what other district judges have imposed in comparable cases that it's no wonder that the government wants you to disregard those other cases. The data presented in our sentencing memorandum reflects what real judges in this court, in federal court, have done in real cases, and those are the cases the Court should

rely upon.

Another factor that we've set forth in our memo concerns the conditions of confinement now and after sentencing. As your Honor is aware, there are 1,600 cells in the Plymouth Correctional Facility. Two of them are designated the super max cells, and Tarek is in one of those cells. He's incarcerated in this cage 23 hours a day, five days a week. And the other two days a week he remains in the cage for 24 hours a day.

Studies that we've presented in our memo show the impact that this has on a human being's mental health. And that's a factor the Court can take into account in mitigation. Similarly, the Bureau of Prisons has chosen a policy that will put people who are charged with terrorist offenses in the super max prisons where they intentionally are deprived of any contact. Indeed, while Tarek has been in Plymouth, almost the last three years, he has never had contact, human contact, been able to touch and hug his mother or father, nor is he allowed to have any interaction with other inmates; he's kept in isolation. And that's how his sentence will be carried out as well.

A final factor I'd like the Court to consider is the unbelievable support Tarek Mehanna has received from the community. How many times has your Honor sat in this courtroom at a sentencing and the only people in the audience have been

the defendant's mother and his sister? How many times has the Court seen an outpouring of support from the community urging the Court to be merciful? These are letters that were written by loyal Americans, including the Islamic Council of New England who would never, ever provide any supportive letter for anyone that they remotely believed was a terrorist.

Many of these people have known Tarek for years. He's been their neighbor, he's been at the mosque with them together, he's filled their prescriptions at Walmart and CVS, and he's taught their children. Those letters attest to the fact that he has lived a good and generous and kind life, including giving away his allowance every week to people who needed it more than he, distributing food from his home to people who were hungry. This is the character of the man who is before you. The letters were at times highly eloquent; they were always sincere. And many people said they rested their faith in the criminal justice system on what is going to be the outcome of this proceeding.

If Ahmed Mehanna had been permitted to testify, he would tell you that he rode to school with his son for the entire eight years, and above all, his son was affected by the suffering he saw of innocent people in Iraq. And he would also tell you that no man in Ahmed's family has lived as long as he has and that he is afraid that he will never again be able to hug or kiss his son if your Honor imposes a sentence remotely

like what the government is asking for.

Souad would tell you anecdotes about how Tarek has been so kind and so generous to even strangers since he's been a young boy; he always thought of others instead of himself.

She would tell you how she cries every single day and night for her son whom she has not hugged or even touched in almost three years, and that her pain as a mother is unbearable.

As a father I look at my children who are in their twenties. My wife and I have tried to instill good values, good morals as a foundation of a good life. And we hope we've succeeded. We also are aware that young kids sometimes do things that are real concerning, and a parent cannot unring that bell. But as a parent we just pray that they don't do something that will lead to the destruction of their life. And if they do ever appear before the judge, we hope that these are the factors that will be taken into account and that mercy will be one of the ingredients in a just sentence.

Your Honor, I'm going to end by paraphrasing the words of a man who may have had the greatest insight into the human condition of any human being that's ever lived on this planet. That man is William Shakespeare. And his character is in the "Merchant of Venice" describing the effect when the king shows mercy. The words apply equally to a judge, and I will adapt those words to this setting. I won't pretend to read it from memory.

"The quality of mercy is not strain'd. It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven upon the place beneath. It is twice blest: It blesseth him that gives and him that takes. Tis mightiest in the mightiest; it becomes the throned judge better than his gavel. His sentencing ability shows the force of temporal power. The attribute to awe and majesty, wherein doth sit the dread and fear of judges. But mercy is above this sentencing power. It is enthroned in the hearts of judges; it is an attribute to God himself; and earthly power of judges doth then shall like God's when mercy seasons justice."

Thank you very much, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. CARNEY: Your Honor, before we conclude sentencing, I'd ask the Court to permit my client to allocute.

THE COURT: Of course. Mr. Mehanna?

THE DEFENDANT: I appreciate your giving me the chance to speak.

It was four years ago this month that I was finishing a work shift at a local hospital. And as I was walking out to my car, two federal agents approached me and they said that I had a choice to make. They said that I could do things the easy way or I could do them the hard way. The easy way, as they explained, was that I would become an informant for the government. And if I did so, I would never have to see the inside of a courtroom or a prison cell. The hard way is what

you see before you. Here I am, having spent the majority of the four years since that day in a solitary cell the size of a small closet in which I'm locked down for 23 hours a day, living with rapists and murderers and home invaders and child molesters.

The FBI and these prosecutors worked very hard, and the government spent millions of tax dollars to put me in that cell, to keep me there, to put me on trial, and finally, to have me stand here before you today to be sentenced to even more time in a cell.

In the weeks leading up to this moment, many people have given me their suggestions as to what it is I should say to you. Some suggested that I should plead for mercy in hopes of a light sentence. Others suggested that I'm going to be hit hard either way. What I want to do for the next couple of minutes is simply to talk about myself.

When I refused to become an informant the government responded by charging me with the crime of supporting the Mujahidin, fighting the occupation of Muslim countries around the world, or as they like to call them, the terrorists. But I wasn't born in any Muslim country; I was born and raised right here in America. And it's something that angers many people, that I could be an American and believe the things that I believe and say the things that I say and take the positions that I take. But everything that a man is exposed to in his

environment is like an ingredient which shapes his outlook and shapes his life in one way or another. And I'm no different. So in more ways than one, it's because of America that I am who I am.

When I was six years old I began amassing a collection of comic books. Batman implanted a concept in my mind, introduced me to a paradigm as to how the world is set up: that there are oppressors, there are the oppressed, and there are those who step up to defend the oppressed. And that resonated with me so much that throughout the rest of my childhood I gravitated towards any book I could find that reflected this concept. So my favorites were Uncle Tom's Cabin, the Autobiography of Malcolm X and so forth. And I even found an ethical dimension to the Catcher in the Rye.

By the time I got to high school and began taking serious history classes, I started to learn just how real this parodyne was in the world, and still is. So I learned in high school as a student in the classroom about the native Americans and what befell them at the hands of Columbus and the European settlers who came after him. I learned about how the descendants of those European settlers were, in turn, oppressed under the tyranny of King George III. I read about people like Paul Revere and Tom Paine and about how Americans began an insurgency against British forces, an insurgency that we now celebrate as the American Revolutionary War. And, in fact, as

a kid I went on school field trips to visit the most famous battlefields of that war, some just a few blocks from this courthouse. I learned about Harriet Tubman, Nat Turner, John Brown, and the fight against slavery in this country. I learned about Emma Goldman and Eugene Debs and the struggles of the labor unions and the poor and working class. I learned about Anne Frank and the Nazis and how they persecuted minorities and imprisoned dissidents. I learned about Rosa Parks, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights struggle. And I learned about Ho Chi Minh, and how the Vietnamese fought for decades to liberate themselves from one invader after another. I learned about Nelson Mandela in the fight against apartheid in South Africa.

Everything I learned in those years confirmed that parodyne that I was introduced to when I was six: that throughout history, there has been a constant struggle between the oppressed and their oppressors. And with every struggle that I learned about, I found myself consistently siding with the oppressed and consistently admiring and respecting those who stepped up to defend them regardless of nationality, regardless of religion. And I never threw my class notes away. As I stand here speaking, they are piled very neatly in my bedroom closet at home.

From these personalities and names and figures in history that I learned about, one stood out for me above the

rest. I was impressed by Malcolm X in many ways, but above everything, I was fascinated by the concept of transformation -- of his transformation. If you've ever seen the movie "X" by Spike Lee, it's over three and a half hours long, and the Malcolm at the beginning of the movie is very different from the Malcolm at the end. At the beginning, he begins a life -- he begins his life as an illiterate criminal, but he ends it as a husband, as a father, as an eloquent and protective leader of his people, as a disciplined Muslim performing the Hajj in Mecca, and finally, as a martyr. The life of Malcolm X taught me that Islam was not simply something one is born with or inherits. It's not a culture. It's not an ethnicity. It's a way of life. It's a state of mind that anyone can choose regardless of where they're born, regardless of how they were brought up.

And this led me to look deeper into Islam, and I was hooked. I was a teenager back then, but Islam had the answer to the biggest questions that I was asking myself, the questions that the greatest scientific minds had been unable to answer, the questions that the rich and famous were sometimes driven to depression and suicide from being unable to answer: Why do we exist? What's the purpose of life? What's the purpose of our presence in the universe?

So Islam had all of these answers prepared for me. Not only that, but it had the answer of exactly how we are

supposed to exist. And because there's no hierarchy, because there's no priesthood in Islam, I was able, on my own, to immediately and directly dig into the Qur'an and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, sallallahu alayhi wasallam, and begin this journey of learning what this was all about, of the implications of Islam for me as a human being, as an individual, on the people around me, on society, and on the world as a whole. And the more I learned, the more I began to value Islam and cherish it like a piece of gold, like my own personal treasure. This was back when I was a teenager, but even today and despite the pressures of the last few years, I stand here before you and before everyone in this courtroom as a very proud Muslim.

Muslims in different parts of the world. And everywhere I looked, I saw the powers that be trying to destroy what I loved. I learned about what the Soviets had done to the Muslims of Afghanistan. I learned what the Serbs had done to the Muslims of Bosnia. I learned what the Russians were doing to the Muslims of Chechnya. I learned what Israel had done in Lebanon, and what it continues to do in Palestine until today with the full backing of the United States. And I learned what America itself was doing to Muslims. I learned about the Persian Gulf War and the depleted uranium bombs that were dropped all over Iraq that killed thousands of people

immediately and caused cancer rates to skyrocket around that country. As Jay mentioned, I learned about the American-led sanctions on Iraq, that according to the United Nations itself resulted in the deaths of over half a million children under the age of five because they made it illegal for food and medicine and medical equipment to be imported into the country.

I saw an interview of Madeleine Albright on "60 Minutes" where she was directly asked about these half a million children who had perished. And her response, she expressed her belief very clearly that these half a million children were, quote, "worth it." I then watched on September 11th, 2001, as a group of people felt so driven and so outraged by the deaths of these children that they hijacked airplanes and flew them into buildings. I then watched as America attacked and invaded Iraq directly in 2003. I saw the effects of shock and awe in the opening days of the invasion. I saw footage of children, of babies in hospital wards with shrapnel from American missiles sticking out of their foreheads. And, of course, none of these were shown on CNN.

I learned about the town of Haditha, where 24 Muslims, including a 76-year-old man in a wheelchair, women and even toddlers were shot up and blown up in their night clothes as they slept by U.S. Marines. I learned about Abeer al-Janbi, a 14-year-old Iraqi girl who was gang-raped by five American soldiers who then shot her and her parents in the head and set

fire to their corpses.

This is a picture of that girl. And as you can see,

Muslim women do not even show their hair to unrelated men. And

I ask you to just imagine for a moment a 14-year-old girl from

a conservative village in the middle of Iraq who has never

encountered a foreigner in her life having her dress torn off

of her body and being sexually assaulted by not one, not two,

not three, not four, but five American soldiers. Just imagine

that for a second.

The government always talks about how angry I am and they're holding it against me as a crime. How can anyone not be angry when they hear a story like this? And even today as I sit in my jail cell, I read in the papers about the drone attacks that continue to kill Muslims in Pakistan, in Somalia, in Yemen every other day. Just last month we heard about the 17 Afghan Muslims, mostly mothers with their kids, who were shot to death by an American soldier who then also set fire to their corpses. And these are just snapshots. These are just the stories that make it to the headlines. These are just the tip of the iceberg.

But my point is that one of the first concepts that I learned in Islam was the concept of loyalty, the concept of brotherhood, that every Muslim woman in the world is my sister and every Muslim man in the world is my brother, and together we are one large body who must protect each another. In other

words, there was no way that I could be witnessing these things being done to my brothers and sisters around the world, including by the United States of America, and remain neutral. My sympathy for the oppressed continued, but it now became more personal, as did my admiration for those who stepped up to defend them.

I mentioned Paul Revere. When Paul Revere jumped on a horse and took his midnight ride, it was for the purpose of warning the people that the British were going to march to Lexington to arrest Sam Adams and John Hancock, and then on to Concord to confiscate the weapons that were stored there by the Minutemen. By the time the British got to Concord, they found the Minutemen waiting for them. Weapons in hand, the Minutemen shot at the British, they engaged them in battle, and they beat them. And from that battle came the American Revolution.

There's a word in Arabic which describes what those
Minutemen did that day, and that word was mentioned many times
in this courtroom: jihad. And this is what my trial was
about. This is what all those videos and all those
translations and all this childish bickering over, "Oh, look,
he translated this paragraph and he edited this sentence." And
all these exhibits, this is what it all revolved around, this
single issue: Muslims defending themselves against American
soldiers, doing to them exactly what the British did to
America.

It was made 100 percent crystal clear at trial that I never, ever plotted to kill Americans at shopping malls or anywhere else. The government's own witnesses contradicted their accusation. We brought expert after expert and put them up on that stand for hours to dissect my every written word to clarify my beliefs on that matter. Furthermore, when I was free, the government themselves sent an undercover agent to try to ensnare me in one of their little fake terror plots, and I refused to participate in that. But mysteriously, the jury never heard about that.

So this trial was not about my position on Muslims killing American civilians; this trial was about my position on Americans killing Muslim civilians. And that position is very simple: that Muslims should defend themselves from foreign invaders, whether those invaders are Soviets or Americans or martians. This is not terrorism and it's not extremism; it's the simple logic of self-defense. And it's what the arrows in that seal above your head represent: defense of the homeland.

If someone breaks into your home to try to rob you and to try to harm you and your family, logic dictates that you would do whatever it takes to expel that invader from your home. But when that home is a Muslim land and that invader is the U.S. military, for some reason the standards suddenly change and common sense is renamed "terrorism," and those people fighting to defend themselves and their families and

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their honor become the terrorists. And even though they're defending themselves from people who cross the ocean to come and kill them, they're accused of killing Americans.

The mentality that America itself was victimized by when British soldiers walked these streets two and a half centuries ago is the same mentality that Muslims are being victimized as American soldiers walk their streets today, and it is the mentality of colonialism.

Last month when those 17 Afghans were killed, I followed the debate in the media. I followed the discussion. And what I noticed was that people were focusing entirely on the soldier: on his life, on his stresses, on his PTSD, on the mortgage on his home, as if he was the victim. Nobody said anything about the people that he actually killed, as if they're not even real, as if they're not people. And unfortunately, this mentality trickles down to everyone in society, whether they realize it or not. Even with my own lawyers, it took two years of weekly meetings and discussions and explaining and clarifying and trying to simplify my logic -- two years before they were finally able to think outside the box and at least ostensibly accept the logic in what I was saying. Two years. And if it took this long for people so intelligent, whose job it was to defend me, people so dedicated, then to throw me in front of a jury -- a randomly selected jury -- under the premise that they are my impartial

peers, I mean, come on. I wasn't tried before a jury of my peers because with the mentality in America today, I don't have any peers. And counting on this fact, the government prosecuted me not because they needed to, but simply because they could.

One last thing I learned in history class is this:

America has historically supported some of the most unjust policies against its minorities, even protecting those policies with the law, only to come decades later and look back and say, "What were we thinking?" We can look at slavery; we can look at Jim Crow; we can look at the interment of Japanese during World War II. Each of these policies during their respective times was widely accepted in society. And, in fact, each was also defended by the Supreme Court. But as time passed and the world changed, both people and the courts reversed course and looked back and said, "What were we thinking?"

Nelson Mandela was considered a terrorist by the government of South Africa and was given a life sentence. But as time passed and the world changed, South Africa shook off its prevalent mentality, they realized just how oppressive their policies were and that it was not he who was the terrorist, and they released him from prison and he even became president. So everything is subjective. Even this business of terrorism and who is and isn't a terrorist. One day the Mujahideen fighting an invader are freedom fighters; the next

day those same exact Mujahideen fighting a different invader on the same land become terrorists. So it all depends on the time and the place and who the super power in the world happens to be at the moment.

In your eyes I'm a terrorist, and it's perfectly logical and reasonable and acceptable that I be standing here, the only one in this room in a bright orange prison jumpsuit. This is perfectly acceptable to you and many people in this country. But history repeats itself. One day America will change and people will look back and they will recognize this day for what it is. They're going to look back at how hundreds of thousands of Muslims were killed and maimed by the U.S. military in foreign countries, yet somehow I'm the one standing here about to go to prison for conspiring to kill and maim in those same countries because I support the Mujahidin who are defending those people.

The government spent millions of dollars to imprison me as a so-called terrorist, but if we were to bring this girl back to life at the moment that she was being raped by your soldiers and put her on that stand and ask her who she thinks the terrorists are, she sure as hell wouldn't be looking at me.

The government repeatedly says that I obsessed over violence and I obsessed over killing Americans, but there is no lie more ironic that I have ever heard.

MR. CHAKRAVARTY: For the record, I wanted to put a

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     couple of things on the record. First, what the defendant just
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     said about having been approached by the FBI on multiple
     occasions and his characterizations are categorically false.
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     I'll let your Honor --
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              THE DEFENDANT: You're a liar. Sit down. You're a
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     liar. You're a liar.
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              MR. CHAKRAVARTY: I'll let your Honor assess his
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     contrition.
              THE DEFENDANT: You're a liar. Sit down.
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              MR. CHAKRAVARTY: Mr. Mehanna, why don't you tell us
     who these people are who were attempting to --
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              THE COURT: Mr. Chakravarty.
              MR. CHAKRAVARTY: Sorry, your Honor. But to highlight
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     the position, he still possesses information that he is trying
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     to reinvent his own story --
              MS. BASSIL: I object, your Honor.
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              MR. CARNEY: I object too.
              MR. CHAKRAVARTY: -- about this.
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              MR. CARNEY: This is not the forum for this.
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              THE COURT: All right. I agree with that. We'll take
     a 15-minute recess and return.
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              THE CLERK: All rise for the Court. The Court will
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     take a 15-minute recess.
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              (The Court exits the courtroom and there is a recess
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     in the proceedings at 11:55 a.m.)
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THE CLERK: All rise.

(After the recess, the Court enters the courtroom at 12:20 p.m.)

THE CLERK: For a continuation of the sentencing hearing. Please be seated.

THE COURT: The sentencing statute, Section 3553(a) of Title 18, sets forth a number of specific categorical factors to be considered by a court in devising an appropriate sentence. The weight given to any particular factor varies from case to case based on the particular facts and context of the case at hand. It is not uncommon that the factors sometimes might point in different directions, and it is an accommodation, or the balance of the several factors, that ultimately should support the judgment that is made. So let me address the factors in some detail.

Two of the factors are the nature and circumstances of the offense and the need to provide for just punishment of that offense. The defendant was convicted after trial of providing and attempting and conspiring to provide material support to al Qa'ida, support that he intended to have the effect of advancing al Qa'ida's murderous operations in Iraq and elsewhere. He was convicted of conspiring with others to join in training camps in the hope of actually engaging in fighting himself. He was also convicted of conspiring with others both in person and through the internet to perform services,

including translation and dissemination services, in support of al Qa'ida. The proof came some through witnesses, but much of it consisted of the defendant's own words in chats and emails and recordings.

The trip to Yemen for the defendant in the end proved to be a more or less feckless attempt, though it was no less a serious attempt for its failure. It was an attempt, the result of a conspiracy, to join in an armed struggle against American forces and American nationals. It is long settled in our law that conspiracy and attempt are punishable by substantial penalties even in the event of their failure to succeed.

Later the defendant found a more suitable and congenial role: He could provide material support to al Qa'ida by proselytizing and translating, knowingly and intentionally, according to the evidence, aiding the media wing of al Qa'ida, As-Sahab, and others in promoting violent jihad and recruiting young Muslim men of the English-speaking West to active participation in that jihad. He was effective in those efforts both at a micro and at a macro level.

At the micro level he was a charismatic leader, as I think we have seen this morning, of a small group of Massachusetts men who, with him, were drawn into radical Salafist jihadi theology and ideology, such as Massoud, Abu Bakr, Maldonado, Spaulding, Abu Zahra, and even Abousamra. Among other things, including his strong and magnetic

personality and his native intelligence, the defendant's serious religious scholarship made him a kind of leader in that group, and they looked to him for leadership and guidance, and he encouraged them to radical action.

At the macro level he was a respected voice in web forums, chat rooms, one-on-one messaging. He was an active participant in the radical at-Tibyan forum and was, from the evidence at trial, including posts from that forum -- he was accorded a degree of respect from the other participants.

It is true he eventually was "kicked off," I think as Mr. Carney put it at trial, the forum because his views were not as extreme as others, but extremity is a relative term, and it would be hard to characterize the defendant's views as moderate simply because they weren't at the outer edge of extremity. The debate was -- or at least the one that was highlighted at trial -- was exactly who it was permitted to kill in the execution of jihad. And the defendant expressed concern about violence to those whom he regarded as truly innocent, but it was also plain that he had no qualms about the killing by explosive device or by beheading of persons whom he regarded as supporting U.S. military action in Muslim countries, including non-military personnel who were in support.

He translated important propaganda works including, of course, the "39 Ways" and the "Expedition of Umar Hadeed,"

which celebrated and encouraged suicide bombers, and as a consequence he was sought out on occasion by al Qa'ida in Iraq as a translator for other works, including one by as important a figure as Ayman al-Zawahiri. That he was sought out in this way, even though in that instance he did not undertake the work, showed that at least some in al Qa'ida valued the support that he was able to give.

It was possible, even appropriate, a few months ago to wonder whether the defendant could be guilty of the crimes he was charged with, but the jury has answered that question, and that verdict necessarily implies the rejection of the defendant's argument made at trial that his activity was limited to protected speech or independent advocacy. To think otherwise, one would have to disregard a great deal of the actual trial evidence. So that's a summary of the criminal acts that support the verdicts in the case, and those acts warrant a substantial criminal sanction as a penalty.

Another factor in the statute is the need to promote respect for the law. This is a consideration that looks in two directions. On the one hand, the sentence must be one that satisfies the wider community that the law has been vindicated by the sentence imposed; that is, that the punishment fits the crime and is imposed in an appropriate and proportionate way to the seriousness of the offense. This satisfies the community's legitimate interest in a retributive punishment.

On the other hand, the sentence must also promote respect for the law in the sense that it serves as a warning to those who might be tempted to commit similar offenses, that their criminal acts will be punished appropriately as well. And this serves as an instrument of deterrence of future criminal conduct. Both of these interests are also significant in this case.

Another factor in the statute is the history and characteristics of the defendant. This can often be a confounding factor. In many ways, many genuine ways, the defendant has behaved as an exemplary citizen, as the many letters submitted in his support attest. I credit the facts and opinions expressed in those letters, as far as they go. Even the evidence in the case showed the defendant to be an intensely serious young man interested sincerely in how he should form his life and conduct to please God and to exemplify Islamic life properly lived. That itself is noble and praiseworthy.

He became, however, consumed with a religious enthusiasm that was at once partly admirable and partly horrifying. And as to the events at issue in this case, the horrifying part came to dominance and it led him to willful participation in the conspiracies and attempts, of which he stands convicted.

Many of the letter-writers have noted how difficult it

is for them to believe that the Tarek Mehanna that they knew could simultaneously be the Tarek Mehanna described in the indictment and, it must be said, substantiated in the trial evidence.

The sad fact is that it is not an uncommon phenomenon. One might call it the Jekyll-and-Hyde phenomenon. It is a reality of human nature that we all have capacities for both good and evil, and we all do acts both good and evil in various proportions in the course of our lives. And the good and evil impulses and acts sometimes occur simultaneously with each other. In sentencing we see this phenomenon, as I say, commonly. You might be surprised how frequently people convicted of serious crimes are shown to have lived, in other respects, lives of probity and charity. Just as two wrongs don't make a right, two rights don't excuse a wrong, and the wrong still must be punished. Still, the punishment must be appropriate specifically to this defendant and it should take account of who he is, fully considered.

A related consideration mandated by the statute is the need to protect the public from future crimes by the defendant. One object of criminal punishment is simply to incapacitate a defendant from committing another offense by reason of incarceration. That is typically an immediate or near-term objective effective during the term of incarceration. Another object of punishment for the longer term is to deter the

punished defendant from repeating his offense. This could occur by effecting a change of heart or by inducing a practical and self-interested calculation. In either event, the sentence should be sufficient to promote, optimally bring about, a commitment in the defendant not to reoffend. Both considerations apply here.

I am, frankly, concerned by the defendant's apparent absence of remorse notwithstanding the jury verdict. His position in this respect has, as I think we have seen this morning, a quality of defiance. As a consequence, this factor has significant prominence in the overall assessment of an appropriate punishment.

Two other related and important statutory factors affecting sentencing are the advice of the Sentencing Guidelines and the need of a sentence to avoid creating unwarranted disparities with other similarly situated cases. The statute requires the Court to consider the advice that emerges from the Sentencing Guidelines as to appropriate sentencing ranges, and it requires the Court to consider the need to avoid unwarranted disparity for similarly situated defendants.

These two requirements work in harmony. A principal purpose of the Guidelines has always been to provide judges with a common rubric and framework for deciding on an appropriate sentence, and by that commonality to try to reduce

disparity in judgments from one judge to another and one defendant to another. And in general terms, adhering to Guidelines recommendations tends to have that effect.

Nevertheless, the Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory, and a sentencing judge is ultimately responsible for imposing a just sentence in the particular case at hand, and that ultimate goal is not to yield to an uncritical adherence to the Guidelines' recommendation.

Some Guidelines provisions, such as the drug offense Guidelines, are frequently consulted. And as a result, there is a large body of decisions involving their application.

Where there has been such wide experience with guideline provisions, there is an opportunity to assess how well those provisions serve all the relevant sentencing factors, including the reduction of disparity in sentencing. And as has recently occurred with the drug Guidelines, that experience can lead to a revision of the Guidelines to improve the match between their intention and their effect. The Guidelines at issue in this case have not had a similar frequency of application and, consequently, our collective experience with them is much more limited.

At least from the perspective of this case to which my attention has been directed, I do not think the Guidelines applied in accordance with their terms do an adequately reliable job in balancing the relevant sentencing factor for

several reasons: First, the terrorism adjustments that we referred to when we set the Guidelines range operate in a way that is too general to be convincingly reliable in a given case. Both the 12-level adjustment to the offense level and the automatic assignment of a Criminal History Category VI which are applied in any case that can be fairly characterized as a terrorism case, regardless of the particular facts, not only make the recommendation unuseful as a guide in a particular case but is actually, in my view, contrary to and subversive of the mission of the Guidelines which is to address with some particularity the unique facts of the given case. And gross adjustments such as the ones I've referenced do not do that.

Moreover, the automatic assignment of a defendant to a Criminal History Category VI is not only too blunt an instrument to have genuine analytical value, it is fundamentally at odds with the design of the Guidelines. It can, as it does in this case, import a fiction into the calculus. It would impute to a defendant who has had no criminal history a fictional history of the highest level of seriousness. It's one thing to adjust the offense level upward to signify the seriousness of the offense. It is entirely another to say that a defendant has a history of criminal activity that he does not, in fact, have.

Contrast this situation with the career offender

guideline which makes a somewhat similar adjustment. But in that instance the Guidelines make an adjustment to a defendant's criminal history score precisely because he has a certain criminal history. The adjustment to criminal history called for by Section 3A1.4(b) is, I believe, simply a way of "cooking the books" to get to a score and a desired sentencing range, at least as it is applied in the context of this case. So I find the Guidelines literally taken, because of those problems and perhaps a few others, not to be reliable advice.

Another way of assessing the usefulness of Guidelines advice is to look at how they have been actually applied, a kind of judicial biofeedback. A survey of cases involving convictions under the same statutes that are involved in this case indicates that courts have frequently varied downward by significant degrees from the range recommended by these Guidelines.

I asked our probation officer to obtain some statistical data from the Sentencing Commission regarding recent sentences under Sections 2339A and 2339B and 956, the key statutes involved here. The data she obtained is for fiscal years 2009 through 2011. It is a small sample and may not be statistically reliable. I don't use it for that purpose but for illustrative purposes.

In that period, that three-year period, offenders convicted under 2339B received non-government-sponsored

below-range sentences slightly more than half the time. For convictions under 2339A that figure rose to just above two-thirds. In cases involving both statutes there are only seven cases, and six of the seven received non-government-sponsored below-range sentences. Five offenders were convicted in that period under both 2339A and 956, and four of the five received non-government-sponsored below-range sentences.

As I say, these figures are, admittedly, a non-rigorous analysis, but they do suggest that judges faced with sentencing decisions in individual cases have not found the Guidelines range helpful in establishing the appropriate sentence. And, of course, in this case, even the government's recommended sentence is below the calculated guideline range and is, I guess, implicitly, a government-sponsored below-range recommendation.

All that said, the Guidelines at issue are not wholly without some advisory value. If the principal defects, as I've found them, are omitted from the calculation, leaving in place the respective base offense levels and more common adjustments, such as role in the offense or obstruction of justice, one can hypothesize a calculation that tends to correct for what I find to be the defects in the Guidelines as they are written and strictly applied.

Without going through the details, because this is a

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hypothesis and not a strict application, leaving out the terrorist adjustment to the offense level and the postulation of a criminal history of Category VI, the offense level under Count 1 would be 30; under Counts 2 through 4, 35; and under Counts 5 through 7, 14. Under the grouping rules, which are uncontroversial, the highest level, 35 for Counts 2 through 4, would be used, and that is appropriate in this case because those represent the gravamen of the prosecution.

Using a true criminal history category of I with a Level 35 produces a suggested quideline range -- and this is hypothetical, I repeat -- of 168 to 210 months. That range is generally in line with what the Sentencing Commission statistics indicate. For the same period, 2009 to 2011, the average sentence imposed on convictions under 2339B was 179 and a half months, and the median was 135. For convictions under 2339A the average sentence was 164.7 months, and the median was 144. For convictions under both sections the average was 171.5, and the median 112.5. The numbers are substantially higher when a conviction under 956 is involved, as it is here, although, again, the sample size is very small for these cases. For convictions under 956 alone -- and there are a total of 12 in the relevant period -- the average sentence was 276.3 months, and the median 222. For the five convictions under both 2339A and 956, which is also the case here, the average sentence was 242 and a half months, and the median was 204.

Now, I've used a lot of numbers, and I don't mean this to be a mathematical computation. My point is simply to try to consult those non-Guidelines guidelines that might help make a decision about an appropriate sentence, having in mind what is legitimate, in my view, about the Guidelines and, two, the need to avoid unwanted disparities across cases. I should add, of course, that none of this comparison addresses the particular facts of any of the cases; this is simply outcomes only. But in sum, when the features of the relevant Guidelines here that I find to be defective are removed from the calculation, the resulting range is substantially consistent with what judges seem to have been actually doing in cases involving charges under the same statutes.

Now, proposing that hypothetical or "ghost" guideline, as I say, yields a suggested range, if we can even call it that, of 168 to 210. In coming to that conclusion, I have made two major judgments, disregarding parts of the Guidelines as written, that have been favorable to the defendant.

Taking consideration of all the factors in 3553(a), including, in particular, the need for just punishment for the offense, the need to protect the public from future offenses by the defendant, and the need to avoid unwanted disparity, I think it is appropriate to impose a sentence at the upper end of that range, hypothetical range, of 210 months.

So, Tarek Mehanna, if you would stand, please.

(The defendant complies.)

THE COURT: Tarek Mehanna, on your conviction of these offenses and pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act, it is the judgment of the Court that you be and you hereby are committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of 210 months. This consists of a term of 210 months on Count 4 of the second superseding indictment, terms of 180 months on Counts 1 through 3 of the superseding indictment, and terms of 60 months on each of the Counts 5 through 7, all terms to be served concurrently.

Upon your release from imprisonment you shall be placed on supervised release for a term of seven years, all to be served concurrently on each count.

Within 72 hours of your release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, you shall report in person to the district to which you have been released.

Because it is highly unlikely that the defendant will have the wherewithal to pay a fine, I will not impose any monetary fine.

While you're on supervised release you shall comply with all the standard conditions that pertain to that status. Those are set forth in the United States Sentencing Guidelines at Section 5D1.3(c). They're incorporated now by reference but will be set forth at length in the judgment.

In addition to those standard conditions, you shall

comply with the following conditions of supervised release:

You shall not commit another federal, state or local crime; you shall not illegally possess any controlled substance. I will not impose any drug-testing conditions. There's no indication of substance abuse.

You shall submit to the collection of a DNA sample as directed by the probation office. You're prohibited from possessing a firearm, destructive device or other dangerous weapon.

There is a mandatory assessment on each conviction of a felony offense in the amount of \$100, which accumulates to \$700, and that assessment is due forthwith.

THE CLERK: Tarek Mehanna, you have the right to file a notice of appeal in this case. If you do wish to file an appeal, you must file it within 14 days from the date the judgment is entered. If you cannot afford an attorney to file the appeal on your behalf, you may request the clerk of the court to file the appeal for you and I will do so.

Do you understand, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Yup.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. CHAKRAVARTY: Your Honor, I'm not sure the appropriate time to register for the record the government's objections to the Guidelines calculation and the sentence and the reasonableness of the sentence, but I want to make sure

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     that's on the record.
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              THE COURT: Noted.
              All right. The defendant stands committed in the
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     custody of the marshal. We'll stand in recess.
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              THE CLERK: All rise. The Court will be in recess.
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              (The Court exits the courtroom and the proceedings
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     concluded at 12:50 p.m.)
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                        CERTIFICATE
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              I, Marcia G. Patrisso, RMR, CRR, Official Reporter of
     the United States District Court, do hereby certify that the
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     foregoing transcript constitutes, to the best of my skill and
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     ability, a true and accurate transcription of my stenotype
     notes taken in the matter of Criminal Action No.
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     09-10017-GAO-1, United States of America v. Tarek Mehanna.
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     /s/ Marcia G. Patrisso
     MARCIA G. PATRISSO, RMR, CRR
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     Official Court Reporter
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     Date: May 16, 2012
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